But perhaps in a way it is still a question. You are trying to show how “functional” information can’t be relied on to prove intelligence, and are instead proposing that information from abstraction is a more reliable indicator. This means we do have to identify whether there are intelligences in nature that can create such abstraction, or whether it must be a human or superhuman intelligence.

One of my earlier questions was whether abstraction can exist outside of human (or superhuman) minds. Perhaps it can, down to the level of bird brains, or caterpillars, or further down to the level of white blood cells that act in seemingly intelligent response to bacterial invasion, or possibly even down to the action of components within the cell, or DNA. That was my original intent with the line of argument I started trying to outline last week but never finished.

If so, maybe Meyer has a case to be made. Maybe he even made the wrong argument, when he identified the information in DNA or cells as just “functional” type of CSI.

On the other hand, even if abstract information can be identified at cellular levels, does it necessarily require a superhuman mind to have created it? I’m not sure that conclusion necessarily follows. If not, then even your modification of Meyer’s assertion doesn’t necessarily provide sparkling evidence of a designer.

I had a purpose in writing the example of birds perceiving the functional complexity of frequencies of light reflected from moths on trees, but in the process of making the argument it went in kind of an unexpected direction. Let me try to clarify, and then go on to another example.

My purpose was to explore your argument of the basic distinction between functional and abstract information, by presenting a series of arguments from nature. But in the process, the example of birds and moths revealed maybe something else. The “functional” complex information exists in the form of the complex interaction of frequencies of light reflected off the moth and the bark of the tree. Of itself, this conveys no abstraction. It is in the bird’s perception of those frequencies of light that the abstract connection is made between “certain patterns of color” = “FOOD”. If I were to look at the same moth, I by no means make the connection that moth=food. This makes the abstract relationship highly contingent. Thus the abstraction about that original source of complexity exists in the mind of the bird, whereas the functional complexity exists simply as properties of material and light.

This example might present an interesting dilemma for ID, which I’m not sure my earlier comments made clear. ID tries to argue that complexity in the source material (DNA) necessarily infers a designer (or Designer) of the complexity. In my example, does the complexity of the source (light reflecting from a speckled white moth sitting on a speckled dark brown tree) infer anything about the design of the placement of that particular moth on that particular tree? Does it infer anything about the design of the tree, or the design of the moth? No, I don’t believe that intelligence can necessarily be derived from the complex information in this case. Is this akin to the argument you are making from functional complexity in the DNA?

Second, we humans observe DNA and perceive it to contain “complexity”. Earlier generations, before the invention of the electron microscope, would have inferred from direct observation that living cells contain little to no information, because they couldn’t observe them at all. What if the abstract information that we perceive in DNA exists only in our minds as the observers, not in the DNA itself? The bird observes something that contains functional complexity, and in its own brain, the bird creates the complex, abstract relationship (moth=food) based on its own perception of the information. Are we doing the same thing by looking at the DNA and inferring the existence of complex information? This may get too deep into epistemology, and distract too much from the main theme of the discussion.

Next, I want to present another argument from analogy that I hope will help me understand better. If we listen to a Beethoven symphony, we hear a complex interaction of frequencies of sound. It is complex on several functional levels (interaction of individual frequencies, interplay of different instruments which produce distinct tones, action of various key and time signatures, repetition of musical themes, and finally the purpose or function of the symphony as a whole). Most of that, except the last, can be described as purely “functional complexity”, if I’m not mistaken. On a more abstract level, the music has an abstract purpose (why was the music written, what was its intended effect, was it intended to make us think of a military march or a mountain valley in springtime, was it intended to make us happy or somber, etc.).

An ID argument would say, this obviously contains all the elements of complexity, and therefore it must have had an intelligent designer to produce such music. We should be able to infer a designer of the music, even if we never saw the symphony play, or even if we couldn’t see the CD player that was reproducing the sounds of a prior performance. However, I think there is a fallacy in this, because we are relying on prior, privileged information. We already know perfectly about symphonies. We know about cellos, what sound they make, and how they are made. We know that symphonies were written by historical individuals, and performed by groups of humans who are brought together intentionally for that specific purpose.

As a counter-example, let’s take a different complex set of interacting frequencies. Stand at a beach and listen to the roll of the waves, the cry of seagulls, the wind whistling off the crags of rock. Or stand in a forest, and listen to the different voices of animals making sounds, the wind rustling through leaves, the sound of a rippling brook. On a functional level, there is no less complexity contained in this set of sounds. There are individual frequencies of sound combining together, many different voices of animals and non-living things, there are varying timing and pitch, there are even repetition of patterns of sounds. Each of the individual sounds has a proximate cause, and many have an intentional purpose in the mind of the animal creating them. But from the complexity of sound in a forest that this particular arrangement of “music” and the functional elements creating the “music” , can we infer that the whole movement was produced by the direct action of a Designer of Forest Music?

I believe ID would have to admit that a Beethoven symphony and a forest symphony have equivalent levels of complexity. And for consistency, I believe they would have to argue that the complexity in a forest symphony necessarily implies a designer of the music, just as with a Beethoven symphony or the structures built by the action of DNA. But I think to do so would be to invalidate most of their argument from complexity. It leads either to a faith statement that God (er, the designer) is causing every bird to chirp and every leaf to rustle; or it pushes back the design argument to the ORIGINS of the birds and leaves and sound, not necessarily the proximate causes of the individual sounds themselves. In which case, it seems to me that it becomes unuseful as any statement about the understanding of science, or of music for that matter.

This is one of several problems in Paley’s watchmaker argument. We have prior, privileged information about watches, we know about factories in which they are assembled, and we know about the gears that are put together as their parts, as well as the purpose of the watch. But what if we find a completely unknown substance, for instance what if we discover a geode for the first time? Does the physical complexity in an unknown substance necessarily imply that an intentional designer created each and every geode, or other structure?

Sorry for the length of the post.

I’m not intentionally trying to detect a minimum level of intelligence in nature. That is kind of a sidebar from my actual comment about birds, but I’ll write more about that in a separate post. My feeling in your responses to Meyer is that they (ID supporters, if not Meyer himself) would say that you’re missing the forest for the trees. In fact, maybe missing several forests, because of looking at the bark of the trees. The information about the cell, and DNA in particular, is presented by ID to show the absolutely amazing complexity in the inner workings of living things — but then they step out to the 1000 foot view and ask how could all this amazing complexity possibly have come about by pure chance, without intelligence. For you to focus simply on the functional elements of DNA at a chemical level, without taking into account the whole as the sum of the parts, seems to miss what is actually going on in DNA, and in ID arguments about DNA. (However, it may be that Meyer has actually contributed to the distraction, as I’ll question below.) It seems like you can deconstruct any living or non-living thing, artificial or natural, into the product of simply electro-chemical reactions, and infer (using your argument) that there is insufficient evidence of intelligence at work.

Let’s take another example, hopefully somewhat analogous. The human mind is tremendously complex. In fact, I think we would have to agree that the human mind IS intelligence (although the intent of Meyer’s argument is to go beyond that, and argue that it must also be the PRODUCT of intelligence). The human mind functions on the basis of complex interactions with various parts of the brain. The brain, in turn can be broken down into nerve pathways, synapses, etc., and ultimately to the action of individual neurons being fired and received. It seems to me that your argument would focus on the action of individual neurons as being entirely “functional” (devoid of abstraction) and therefore not necessarily indicative of the action of intelligence; whereas, an ID type of argument would look at the action of the whole. Individual neurons (the parts) don’t just fire on their own, but they operate in response to and as part of the whole (the human mind). Thus, you can’t just look at the functional elements as functional-only complexity and rule out design (intelligence).

Let me see if I can anticipate the response. I’m guessing you may agree that the action of neurons represent a sort of functional complexity, but that we can’t infer intelligence on the basis of the neurons alone. It might, but it might not be sufficient evidence on its own. Action of higher, more complex structures and interactions of nerve endings and brain lobes are likewise not sufficient evidence of intelligence. We have to go to higher levels of abstract reasoning in the interpretive actions of the human mind to have sufficient proof that intelligence is driving those neurons into action.

Is this a reasonable view of ID, that it tries to take the DNA and cellular “information” or “complexity” as merely background information in order to make a 1000-foot-view argument about the design of the organism as a whole? Is it possible that Meyer, in his effort to establish an argument about design has inordinately detracted from the larger argument by focusing too much on the low-level functional elements? If so, how else could he have made his argument without focusing on the functional complexity? And (this may take more time to answer as you get further into Meyer’s arguments), if intelligence can’t be inferred from the purely functional aspects of DNA, like neurons, at what point can a valid argument be made for abstraction and intelligence when taking into account in the whole structure of the living organism?