A more detailed explanation of how to think about information and complexity can be found in a recent lecture I gave at Gordon College. To follow the lecture, it is helpful to have these notes.
I’ll try to summarize the key points here once more.
Information is physical complexity which may occur through natural causes or crafted by intelligent agents. How can one determine when information is generated by an intelligent agent? Meyer focuses his book on the ID claim that when information is complex and specified, it necessarily comes from an intelligent source. Information, he states, can be specified either by being “functional” or by having “meaning.” He shows that DNA information is of the “functional” type.
The question is raised here whether Meyer has adequately demonstrated the claim that both “functional” and “meaning” type of information must come from intelligence. I suggest that only the “meaning” part has that characteristic and not the purely “functional.” The rationale is that “meaning” is the abstract significance applied to a physical configuration, a feat characteristic of intelligence. All the examples Meyer brings forth to demonstrate how information comes from an intelligent source involve “meaning” or a mixture of “meaning” and “function.” Functional configurations can occur in nature that are quite complex and need not have an intelligent source. This leaves open the question of whether DNA information was derived from an intelligent source.
The second claim examined in the lecture deals with the post on historical causal analysis. To be scientific, a claim for having detected a designer for some event, must involve a designer whose existence and means of design must be independently observable. An indeterminate designer does not meet that criterion.
Randy:
I’ve been trying all week to find the time to reply; and now it’s late, but I want to say something.
I have read your notes and seen the video of the seminar that you gave. It left me with more questions than I have time or energy to pursue right now. But what I would like to continue to pursue is this distinction that you (and Meyer) make between “functional specified information” and “abstract specified information.”
I still think that this distinction is, at best, fuzzy. I will try to show that with two examples, or ought I say paradigms, of the two: the ax and the association of ‘A’ with the first letter of the English alphabet.
There are two distinct kinds of inferences when it comes to information: inferences from the object to the meaning, and from the meaning to the object. The object is the physical encoding of the meaning, or we might say information.
The letter “A” or “a” or any similar approximation written with chaulk, pen, or computer screen is the physical instantiation. This is what I mean by the object. The meaning in this case is “the first letter of the English alphabet.”
But the ax is not so different than the letter “A.” It too has a physical instantiation: this ax, the one with a wooden handle, etc. It also has a meaning. The ax is used to cut wood. It is embedded in a meaningful, and purposeful world.
There is no necessary relationship between the object and the meaning. You indicate that this is so for the physical letter “A,” but it is also just as true for the ax. The physical particular, this ax, could have an infinity of meanings or none at all. There is nothing about the ax that requires that it be used to chop wood. Indeed, the ax could just as well serve as the “first letter of the English alphabet.”
I regard this contingent, and arbitrary relationship between the object and its meaning to be intrinsic in all “information.” We may not be using the same definition of “information,” so we might just call it the “meaning” of the object.
On the other hand, the relationship between the meaning and the object is always constrained by the properties of the physical world. This is as true of the letter “A” as it is for the ax.
If the ax is to be used to chop wood (and not as the first letter of the English alphabet), it must have certain physical properties. It must be harder than the wood it will be used to chop. It must be of a certain weight so that humans can use it, etc. The “function” of the ax entails a certain physical properties of its instantiation.
It is perhaps less obvious, but the physical relationship between the letter “A” and its meaning is also limited. If the object/instantiation is to represent the “first letter of the alphabet,” there are certain physical requirements. It must be easily recognized by human eyes. It must be fairly easy to replicate, and this will depend in part upon the physical properties of the materials that will be used to encode the letter. However, the letter is encoded, it must be sufficiently enduring that it can be read by humans. So the kinds of materials used are restricted by the “meaning” or function of the information.
When I try to relate this picture to the distinction you have tried to draw between the ax and the letter, it seems to me that distinction is more one of degree than of distinct kind.
For both there is no way to infer from the object to its meaning. But it seems that for the ax its meaning or function more tightly constrains the physical than does the “first letter of the English alphabet.” We can perhaps see this more clearly if we speak of encoding procedures using 0s and 1s. All that is physically required is that we have two distinct and sufficiently long-living states that can be readily manipulated. It seems that in instantiated what you call “abstract information,” we are more physically free than in instantiating what you call “functional information.”
Now, we must try to remember that what we are about here is a “design inference.” I claim that it is impossible to infer from any object, whether it be DNA, a car, an ax, or a letter, what its meaning is. But this is different from the design inference. Were we to say that a “meaningful object” is designed, what is required for the design inference is not specifying the meaning of an object, but instead inferring that it is a meaningful object.
The question is whether it is possible to infer that an object has meaning, without being able to say anything about its specific meaning.
Finally, you argue that “functional information” can be either designed or not. An undesigned example of functional information, you say, is a natural nuclear reactor. I hope you can see why this makes no sense in the context of the understanding I suggest here. Do you mean by “function” that it “does something”? You are clearly using a different definition of information than I am. Shannon’s notion of information is not really about what I call information, but rather about the number of distinct states a particular system can be in. It describes something of the physical capacity of a physical system to encode what I call information. Meaning is much richer than this. There is simply no relationship between Shannon “information” and the meaning that is encoded.
The ax is very different from a natural nuclear reactor (e.g., the sun). It is vastly different just because the ax is meaningful, indeed, I would say vastly more complex; and this is because complexity is defined relative physical law and the “chance” interaction of physical systems. The ax is impossible, clearly a natural nuclear reactor is not.
Well, I’ve gone on for too long. Can you provide an example of what you call “functional information” that is also complex?
I hope this makes some sense. If not, allow me to blame a long hard day, and the late hour.
good night.
bill
Bill,
What an excellent comment. Thank you for stating your views so clearly. I believe you and I agree on virtually all points with only some minor clarifications. For instance, the one sentence with which I would differ a bit is “There is simply no relationship between Shannon “information” and the meaning that is encoded.” There is a relationship but it is asymmetrical. Without the physical “Shannon information” there is no meaning while there can be “Shannon information” without meaning. A communication channel can convey a stream of binary states (Shannon information) without a useful meaning. But no meaning can be conveyed through that channel if there is no Shannon information. Meyer makes this same point in his book.
This leads to a key point that needs clarification in your comment, namely the ambiguous use of the term “information.” Technically, as I understand it, the information theorists use the term to refer to the physical complexity that comprises information. This is essentially “Shannon information.” In the vernacular we often use the term “information” to refer to the meaning ascribed to that physical complexity. In other words, the letter “A” has the same technical information content whether there is an English language or not but its meaning will differ depending on what language you know.
Consider, for example, the butterfly alphabet poster. It is indeed amazing that butterflies exist with configurations on their wings of each letter of the alphabet. (I’ve seen it in English but wonder if it exists in other languages as well) The existence of these butterflies is independent of any meaning these patterns might have. The meaning is imposed by the abstraction of some intelligent source.
Yes, all your comments about physical constraints are correct, as far as I can tell. But your statement “…that distinction is more one of degree than of distinct kind.” referring to the ax and the letter “A” also needs a little clarification. The ax functions solely because of its physical characteristics while the letter “A” is meaningful solely because of the abstraction applied to it by intelligent minds. Yes, you may argue that the ax was shaped by an intelligent mind. Indeed and that is why “functional information” is not a sufficient determiner of intelligence. A stone ax can function in the same way as any ax without being shaped by an intelligent person, though its function can be optimized with intelligence. I would suggest that the presence or absence of abstraction is indeed a difference in kind rather than of degree.
Let me try to state it in another sense. All information requires physical complexity. Physical complexity can occur naturally or it can be modified by an intelligent agent. How can we determine the source from the physical complexity? Meyer says that if it is very complex and has either a specific function or a specific meaning, then it had an intelligent source. I’m just saying that this argument is valid only if there is a clear abstract meaning to the complexity, while if it has a function without abstraction, it cannot be determined whether the source is from an intelligent agent or from natural factors apart from the influence of an intelligent agent. DNA information does not involve abstraction and it can therefore not be concluded that it could only be generated from an intelligent source.
As for examples of naturally-occurring complex functional information, living cells are by far the best example, but since we are trying to determine their origin, I’m trying to establish the principle first and then proceed to discuss living cells later. So we could cite almost any natural process in the universe that has a function–natural nuclear reactors, solar fusion, etc.
Randy
Hello Randy,
I watched your lecture and read your notes. Here are some comments:
1. Meyer answers many of your objections in the book, so I would recommend ASA folks to read it. I could not find where Meyer makes the same distinction of specificity as you do (functional vs. abstract) and would be interested where you find this. It seems to me you equivocate on the meaning of functional specificity vis Meyer.
2. You employ what I call an “atheism of the gaps” approach in arguing against Meyers’s position of ruling out possible causes of the origin of life. He argues forcefully that all known materialistic causes are inadequate to account for the information resident in DNA; For you to continue to hold out hope for another materialistic cause, and at the same time refuse to consider a candidate that is known to produce the effect (intelligent agency), is a faith position – not science. It is atheism of the gaps and the antithesis of science (or what science should be, a search for adequate causal agents or mechanisms).
3. You assert that intelligent design is not a “scientific claim”; was it a scientific claim in the 1850s? If yes, why? Also if yes, why not now? The reason is due to metaphysics, and the reigning metaphysical paradigm that has the microphone now is materialism. The nature of discovering truth has not changed – drawing inferences from data has not changed – it is simply the tolerance for particular conclusions.
4. “All information is physical” this is not a necessarily (or even a demonstrably) true statement. One can have information in one’s mind – that is, a thought – that is not physical at all. Numbers are non-physical realities that can be represented physically, but exist apart from the physical world. This assertion that information is physical derives from a metaphysical position called Physicalism, and is the default foundation of much of your argument. You must provide warrant for the statement. But even if you could give some reasons justifying the statement, couldn’t the ID proponent say you have failed to rule out a non-physical source of information based on your own “atheism of the gaps” argument (that just because one proves that the existing materialist candidates in explaining the origin of life are insufficient does not logically preclude future possible adequate material candidates from fitting the bill. Hence, if one can show that all information we currently know of is always in physical form that fact will not preclude the possibility of information that is not in physical form.)
5. As stated above, you seem to equivocate on the meaning of functional specificity used by Meyer and functional as defined by you (See Signature in the Cell page 109). A slug put into a Coke machine is not the same as the information that directs the building of proteins, etc.. The slug is purely mechanical and is meaningless; DNA is not purely mechanical and is meaningful. DNA clearly contains information by its complex and specified arrangement of nucleotide bases, an arrangement that is perfectly analogous to computer code. To say that DNA mediates its task by means of physico-chemical interactions by no means militates against it being an artifact of intelligence – my typing this post is carried out by physico-chemical means, that fact doesn’t detract from the fact that an intelligence is behind said forces. Also, your examples of functional specificity (natural nuclear reactor and “natural selection”) as akin to DNA are woefully weak: one can easily see how the Oklo reactors and environmental pressures come about by natural means – not so with the staggering information content resident in DNA. Hence, I don’t think you’ve put forth a very strong argument here, Randy, that attaching the word “functional” some how makes the inference to design somehow inconclusive.
6. What exactly is Natural Selection? Natural selection is an idea, and not purely a physical thing as used by evolutionists – it is the name given to the phenomenon we see of nature having an effect on living organisms – many of the effects which can be nicely explained. It is this imputation of creativity – an anthropomorphic quality of an Ersatz designer – which so entirely lacks empirical support, yet is so fervently maintained by otherwise hard-nosed scientists. If examined critically, one sees that Darwinism has become a worldview rather than a scientific theory: anytime the theory judges the data (an “incomplete” fossil record) rather than being judged by the data (adequate fossil record – poor theory), then we have entered the realm of an unfalsifiable interpretive grid (worldview) not a falsifiable theory.
7. From whence comes the axiomatic law that says one must know everything about a causal agent before one can impute intelligence to that agent? The inference to intelligence is an everyday exercise (I did it in the emergency department everyday). There is no good reason to doubt ones inference to intelligent agency due to insufficient information on particulars such as mechanism, or the precise identity of the agent. Inference of intelligence is not a metaphysical exercise – it is firmly planted in logic and the empirical – that the final cause is something outside of our understanding seems a pretty poor reason for jettisoning reality in the name of “it isn’t scientific”.
These are a few of my comments. I have more, but my physico-chemical digits are not responding well to my intelligent input. Thanks for your work, Randy.
Larry Parsons
Thank you very much for your thoughtful comments, Larry. I’ll try to address some of them here. The numbers refer back to your comments, which I won’t take space to repeat.
1. On page 359 Meyer has a section called “Two types of information” which he says are “function” and “conforming to a pattern” which is called “meaning” elsewhere in the book. I use the term abstraction which is similar to “meaning” but has a little different connotation which I think is clearer in its significance for an intelligent source. He also refers to these two types in various points in the book.
2. One cannot jump to the conclusion of “atheism of the gaps” because there are several other possible, and in my opinion more likely, reasons for someone to think a natural causal explanation of the origin of life may someday be possible. One is simply that it does not logically follow that just because no solution is known, none is possible. Secondly, there are credible scenarios why one might speculate that a natural solution could be found, independent of any theistic position. Thirdly, as I try to point out in this analysis, Meyer’s argument from information that such a scenario is impossible, is not valid. Most importantly, I think, is that there are very good theistic, creationist perspectives that are consistent with a complete set of natural secondary causes, implying that a solution is possible. Atheism may be a reason for some people but it is not the only one possible.
3. You say that I assert that intelligent design is not a scientific claim. I hope that is not what I said because I had no intention of saying that. Rather I meant to say that an inference to an intelligent designer is most definitely a scientific process and claim, providing the designer is in a class of agents that can be independently observed for their existence and their capability of design. This was true in the 18th century and is true today. Since an indeterminate intelligent designer is not available for independent observation, an inference to such an agent is not a scientific claim. The claim that our universe was designed by an intelligent designer was and continues to be a valid faith claim entirely consistent with all our scientific observations.
4. May I repeat that I am not making a metaphysical statement. I am trying to convey what Claude Shannon and Rolf Landauer, the pioneers of information theory, have taught us. I will provide references in a future post. I personally believe in the existence of a spiritual world and spiritual information, but that’s not what we’re talking about here. We’re focused squarely on the kind of information that you and I as intelligent human beings exchange with each other. Without physical complexity, or configurational entropy if you prefer, there is no information of this type. By the way, I am not at all ruling out non-physical information or sources of information.
5. I’m not sure what you mean that I am equivocating. My point is that there can be functionality without abstraction. Indeed, functionality does not at all rule out an intelligent source. I am simply giving a range of examples of functional information from the very simple slug to the complex natural nuclear reactor to the very complex living cell. More commonly, functionality and abstraction both exist in complex machines. My point is simply that the only unambiguous trademark of an intelligent source is the abstraction part, not the functionality without any abstraction. I didn’t just attach the word “functional” to the description of DNA. Rather, I observed that DNA functionality does not involve any abstraction, in contrast with all the examples Meyer put forth to claim that information can only come from an intelligent source.
6. Natural selection need not be extrapolated to a worldview. In its simplest form, it refers to a replicating system with variations. Those variations leading to enhanced replication success will be more prevalent in the population. Letting the system run leads to an amazing diversity within the system. I think that counts as creativity though I agree that anthropomorphisms can be overused. Natural selection is more than an idea, it is a description of how a replicating system develops.
7. I’m not sure what you mean by “the axiomatic law that says one must know everything about a causal agent before one can impute intelligence to that agent?” I don’t think I said anything like that. I did say that Meyer cites Lyell, Darwin, and Scriven about historical causal analysis as showing that a causal agent must be shown independently to exist and to have the capability of causing that effect. Meyer pleads exemption from this principle on the basis of uniqueness, an exemption which I do not believe he has justified.
Randy
Thanks for the reply, Randy. I should like to keep the numbering system intact here, and reply in kind, though only cursorily on some points.
1. I reread pg 359 and quite frankly I can’t see how you got your definitions of specified complexity from anything Meyer said – in fact, your functional definition is precisely the opposite of Meyer’s given his example of a combination lock that requires a specific series of numbers to open it (as opposed to your hand axe and natural nuclear reactor).
Your novel definition of “abstraction” states that “information derives its specificity from a meaning or significance arbitrarily attributed to a physical configuration by an intelligent being.” By “intelligent being” here you clearly mean “human beings” as the “abstractly designed information” examples you give are human generated, and of course, someone has to be around to do the “attributing”. Question: is there any non-human “abstractly designed information” that can be detected or inferred scientifically? If so, how? My guess is that you will answer negative to this question. It doesn’t seem to me that this distinction is helpful in adjudicating the question of the author of the “signature in the cell” as humans were not present 3 billion years ago when the first cells appeared on the earth, and it rules out apriori other “intelligent beings” as humans weren’t around to witness the “attributing” process.
2. I would interested in seeing the “very good theistic, creationist perspectives that are consistent with a complete set of natural causes” – could you point me to some that I may investigate.
3. You say here and in point 7 that “Since an indeterminate intelligent designer is not available for independent observation, an inference to such an agent is not a scientific claim.” Could you give me reasons to support this assertion (apart from saying Scriven, et.al. say so)? I would really be interested in your warrant for this statement, particularly given the universal experience that it is not true. Let me give you one personal example: I was watching an autopsy during my training on a poor soul who had been found in a ditch in the middle of July in Oklahoma. The man’s body was in a full pike position with a blanket covering the body and tied with a rope binding the head and upper torso to the legs. We untied the rope and unfolded the corpse (I will spare you the hideous details – the smell was indescribable) to find 3 bullet wounds in the back of the head. The pathologist immediately said, “Obvious suicide” – which elicited laughter from me and his assistant. It was funny, of course, because it was so ridiculous – we all inferred that an indeterminate intelligent agent who was not available for independent observation had murdered this man – and we didn’t think that we had all made a faith claim or were being unscientific at the thought!!
The only way around this one Randy, is if you decide to define “scientific” in a way that assumes the very point at issue – that is, a question-begging way. It would also categorize all forensic science as non-scientific.
4. “the kind of information that you and I … exchange with each other. Without physical complexity … there is no information of this type.” Of course there would be no communication without some physical vehicle on which ideas could be transmitted to each other – no one disagree that this is the case among humans – but this was not my point. My point was – and this is a critical distinction for the entire argument – information is transmitted by physical forms but NOT IDENTICAL to the physical means by which it is transmitted from one mind to another. This is easy to prove since the same information can take several forms (digital, mechanical, ink on paper) – that is, information is something different than the media on which it is transmitted. However, information can be detected (inferred from) the physical realm – and this is exactly the point that the ID proponents are asserting. Do you agree or disagree with this characterization of information, Randy?
5. Finally, I still don’t see how a cell and a “complex” natural nuclear reactor could be included together on any list as a “range of examples” of anything but matter. I would say that the DNA in a cell (let alone the whole cell) has a whole lot more in common with a printed construction manual than either would have with an area where water washed together uranium ore that happened to have sufficient quantities of Uranium 235 and water to create a controlled fission reaction. Also, in what way is a natural nuclear reactor “complex”? I mean, if you found a something like a GE fission plant with cooling tower, core, moderating rods and control room with computer feedback control 1.7 billion years old – maybe that could qualify as complex. By the way, if you did find that GE plant that was 1.7 billion years old, could you infer an intelligent agent its source? We’ve found cells from that same time frame that are multiple times more complex than our GE power plant – why can’t we infer an intelligent agent as its source?
Blessings,
Larry
Larry,
I’ll let Randy answer for himself your questions to him. But I would just interject a few responses, using your numbered list.
2. Some creationist perspectives on nature:
A. Essentially natural (secondary) causes are at work, helped along with the occasional miraculous (or “designed”) intervention. This doesn’t fit the description of “complete set of natural causes”, but it could come pretty close depending on how far someone would allow for natural causes to be at work.
B. Fully natural processes are at work in creation, but God’s providence is at work throughout and within all natural processes at all times. Without God’s presence and His providence at work, nothing would exist and natural processes would be incapable of driving forward to the development of mankind in the image of God; yet, science can only observe the outward secondary cause and effect, which appears to be natural.
C. So-called “front-loading” or “fully gifted creation”, where God bestows all the potential in creation from the first moment of creation, so that the universe and life can develop according to His original design and decree without the need for divine intervention.
D. Full “appearance of age” doctrine, whereby God has created miraculously but has chosen to make His creative work appear to have all the appearance of age, including birth and death of stars, geological history, progression of species, etc. While something like this is normally proposed as a creationist attempt to explain non-natural recent creation, if taken to its full extent, it becomes identical to completely natural causes, since science has no way of telling the difference.
3. I don’t think your example of the body found tied and shot to death quite fits. You say “we all inferred that an indeterminate intelligent agent who was not available for independent observation had murdered this man”, but that’s not true — you clearly inferred a known intelligent agent – a human being – not an indeterminate one. You saw bullets and bullet holes. You know what bullets are, how they are made, the fact that they are used in guns, and that guns are made and used by human beings, and you saw rope that you know is made by human invention. You can make independent investigation of human agents and the sorts of inventions that they make, how they act, how they can use tools like guns and rope as proximate causes to commit murder. You were therefore fully justified in making a scientifically sound judgment call that it was a human being that committed murder.
You would NOT have been justified in saying that “Billy Bob Jones from Louisville Kentucky committed the murder”, when you have not established by independent investigation that such a person exists, or that he was present in the area on the day of the murder, or that he has access to a gun, or had a motive, or had the physical capability of doing the act. He would be one type of example of an “indeterminate agent” until you can conduct a scientific-style investigation of his existence, his capabilities, and whether in fact there is evidence that he acted in this particular instance. Claiming that “maybe an intelligent alien committed the murder” is another unjustified assertion of an indeterminate agent.
I think this is Randy’s point — until ID can conduct independent scientific investigation on God (or some other indeterminate designer) we can’t rely on that being as a scientific explanation, but rather it’s a faith statement. Once they do that, the designer is no longer indeterminate. And ID can’t rely on circular reasoning of identifying an indeterminate being as the designer, which in turn proves the existence of the indeterminate being.
5. Your analogy of finding a 1.7 billion year old GE fission plant (I assume with the sign “GE” still in the front yard) is not quite the same as inferring an indeterminate intelligent agent, because it presumes an existing knowledge of what a “GE fission plant” is. We already know that fission reactors are built by intelligent agents. You will assert that the complexity in such a device would be evidence enough to humans living 1.7 billion years from now, but that is precisely the question at issue — whether complexity is sufficient by itself to identify design, without independent knowledge of the device or designer in question.
There is sufficient complexity in Mt. Rushmore to identify there was a human designer because we know human physiology, history, and technology, but what if an intelligent alien (who has no head or limbs in the human sense) comes to visit earth? They would see no evidence of design, because the specific complexity in the faces isn’t recognizable to them. This is an example of a false negative. When I recognize the face of Abraham Lincoln in a particularly complex, but otherwise natural rock formation, there may be plenty of complexity but how can I prove that it wasn’t specified? (or, how do I prove that the “natural” formation wasn’t intentionally formed by an indeterminate intelligent designer?)
I don’t know enough about the natural fission reactors, but I would presume that a particular combination of raw material, location, controlled environment, etc., would all have to be present in order to make them work in just the right way. This seems to fit the ID definition of specified complexity. One of the problems here is, let’s assume for a minute that the Oklo natural reactor has sufficient specified complexity to satisfy Dempski’s “explanatory filter”. How can we determine whether it was designed or purely “natural”? Do we have any examples of purely natural, undesigned fission reactors, and more importantly how can we determine that they ARE entirely undesigned, in order to compare them against designed fission reactors? As a Christian, can we say that anything in nature was truly “undesigned”?
Good questions, Larry. I think Jon gave an excellent reply but I’ll add a bit.
1. I may be confusing things a lot by failing to clarify exactly what Meyer says and what is my interpretation of it and where I am going beyond it. In that passage I cited, Meyer presents two types of specificity, one deriving from function and the other from matching an independent pattern. I refer to the latter as “meaning” which I think captures the essence though it isn’t exactly the same. When I say “abstraction” I’m going beyond what Meyer is saying. Sorry about that.
2. Jon points to some good scenarios. I would just add that the basic Christian doctrine on creation is that there is one God who created and sustains all that exists. He is faithful, the same yesterday, today, and forever. He has endowed humans with the image of God and the responsibility of having dominion over the earth. Hence, it seems reasonable to expect that humans can count on consistent action in the universe with proximal causal relationships that can be identified and “understood”. This is really the Judeo-Christian foundation for the rise of Western science and has been a very influential factor. There is no particular reason biblically or theologically why some part of creation should be exempt from that kind of natural causal explantion. Maybe it is, but it is not atheistic to claim that explanations exist for issues like the origin of life.
3. Your example, gruesome though it be, is a good example of what I was trying to say. Your inference in that case is definitely scientific precisely because the inferred agent is a member of a class of agents (humans) whose existence and whose capability (able to shoot a gun) can be independently studied. One does not need to be able to study the agent who actually did it! If your conclusion had been that “I do not know of any humans who could have done it and therefore it could not have been a human and therefore I conclude it was done by a Martian terrorist” then I would suggest it is not scientific. Why? Because Martian terrorists are not a class of agents that can be independently studied. Relabeling them as “indeterminate terrorists” doesn’t solve the problem.
4. Again, as I recently commented in reply to Jon’s comment, there is an ambiguity in how “information” is used. The physical complexity, or configurational entropy, that embodies information can indeed be detected but it isn’t so easy to determine what it means. There are two aspects to the “intelligence” part of it. One is whether an intelligent agent has assigned a meaning or a value to the various physical states. That is, has someone declared a positive voltage to be a “1″ or a “0″, for example. A second aspect of intelligence is whether that physical complexity was formed by an intelligent agent or whether it formed through natural causes independent of an intelligent agent. Meyer seems to be saying that the latter case can be determined by testing for complexity and specificity, with an existing and adequate causal agent. He says all such cases that we know about have intelligent sources. I’m suggesting that all those examples also involve abstraction (the first aspect) and therefore the argument cannot be extrapolated to cases where no abstraction is evident, such as DNA.
5. I think you are taking my illustrations too far. I wasn’t trying to draw analogies among all those examples or saying they were all that similar. I was just trying to illustrate the point. A slug works because of its shape, not because of an abstract meaning assigned to it. that’s about the simplest I could think of. A natural nuclear reactor is still “simple” but a lot more complex and again functions without any evident abstraction. We’ll come to a lot more interesting examples in living cells later on.
Computer code is often claimed by ID advocates to be identical to or so similar to DNA that it can be concluded that they have the same type of source. But I am suggesting that computer code is rife with all sorts of levels of abstraction (yes, the physical complexity that embodies it has to have a precise characteristic–that’s what I spent my career doing) while DNA does not involve any. That distinction is crucial and breaks the analogy at precisely the point that relates to the source of such information.
Randy
Hey Jon and Randy,
Thanks for the replies – I am really enjoying the exchange!
3. Let me first address what you both replied to here, on the issue of an indeterminate intelligent agent. I think that my point will best be illustrated by explicitly enumerating the inferential steps that we all made to settle upon the best explanation for the circumstances of our “suicide victim,” namely some indeterminate human. Step 1, we examine the body and note several curious features, namely, the body is in a full pike position, an unusual position for a corpse; a blanket is covering the body and a rope is tied around the blanket over the upper torso and lower extremities, binding them together in said pike position; on removal of the blanket, three bullet holes are found in the back of the head. Step 2, we intuit this set of data evidences a “deliberate choice of a conscious, intelligent agent or person to affect a particular outcome, end, or objective” (Meyer’s definition of intelligent design, pg 328-9). Step 3, we infer a human being as the best explanation (recognizing that the type of intelligent agent for which the SETI scientists are looking can not logically be absolutely ruled out as a candidate, that notwithstanding, a human intelligent agent is the best explanation).
It is key here to note the order of the inferential steps: step 2, the inference to an intelligent agent, precedes and is necessary to step 3, the inference to a particular type of intelligent agent, a human being. Please note, I am speaking of an INDETERMINATE intelligent agent – that is, an effect is seen that evidences the intervention of an intelligent agent. The effect contains specified complexity or information. The causal agent is indeterminate, as I am using the term. as the act of creating the effect was NOT WITNESSED. The nature of the causal agent, however, in NOT INDETERMINATE, that is, intelligence.
Think of a Venn diagram: The big oval is labeled “intelligent agency”; within this oval are smaller ovals, the particular agents that possess intelligence – the ability to produce specified complexity – such as “humans” or “SETI type agents.”
It seems to me that both of you are leaving out step two, at least you didn’t make it explicit in your arguments. My point is that step two MUST be in your reasoning process – you must enter the big oval (intelligence) to get to the oval inside (human) – The two ovals are NOT IDENTICAL (just because “human” is the only agent that you normally find in the “intelligence” oval, doesn’t preclude other members – if it does, you might want to drop a line to the scientists at the SETI project!).
Finally, if one were to find a set of circumstances during say the Jurassic period, similar in information content found in step 1, that is, some instance of specified complexity, one may logically maintain step 2, the inference of an intelligence, EVEN IF THERE IS NO HUMAN OVAL in the intelligence oval. That is, lack of a particular member in step 3 does not invalidate prior steps in the inferential endeavor, including step 2, the inference to an intelligent agent. Randy, this seems to be making this error in your lecture as documented on your notes under “Causal existence.” Hence, as Meyer argues on pg 328 ff, the inference to intelligence (step 2 above) is a perfectly legitimate logical and scientific move and even if the particular intelligent agent is indeterminate.
1. & 4. Thanks for clarifying the issue of the two types of specified complexity, Randy. I still have a problem with the “abstraction” requirement, at least as you have defined it in your notes – I would really appreciate your addressing this. You write: “Abstractly designed information derives its specificity from a meaning or significance arbitrarily attributed to a physical configuration by an intelligent being.” So, by definition, aren’t you ruling out intelligence to any set of specified complex stigmata unless the identity of causal agent is known? By this definition, isn’t the work of the SETI scientists a waste of time, since any sequence of numbers or signals would no matter how information ladened, would not count as coming from an intelligence since it lacked abstraction? Also, what is the warrant for placing this restriction on specified complexity? I can see where it would eliminate false positives – but normally one doesn’t worry about false positives with low prevalence – one worries about false negatives!! Your test creates by definition a false negative by designationg intelligent agents that are indeterminate (or not present for inspection by the investigator) as non-agents or entities outside the purview of science.
It seems to me that if we have a definition of science that relegates the realm of information and the pursuit of causal agents for information as outside the ken of science, we need a new definition of science: one that doesn’t deny reality and can look at all of the possible agents that have effects in our universe.
Hope I didn’t make you guys blind with the long post!
Larry
Larry, I really do appreciate your persistence. That’s key to getting clarity.
3. Your step 2 is possible only when one can independently study such intelligent agents. I certainly do include that consideration.
The use of the term “indeterminate” is ambiguous. You seem to use it to refer to the specific individual agent. I used it to refer to the class of agents of which the individual is a member. That’s a big difference.
I’ve never restricted anything to “human”. The intelligence that has capability of abstract reasoning could be chimpanzee, hominid, bird, dog, or whatever. We can study each of them to some degree or another to assess their degree of intelligence. So far, the intelligent agent offered by Meyer or the ID community is not in a class of agents available for independent study.
1&4. I think you’re attributing claims to me that I have not made, or did so unintentionally if I did. Abstraction is, I suggest, a sufficient but not a necessary indicator of an intelligent agent. There can indeed be other indicators. I said that functional complexity may or may not be the result of an intelligent designer. I’m mainly saying that one cannot claim that DNA information, which is functionally specified complexity, can ONLY be generated by an intelligent agent.
No, no, no. This is not an issue of the definition of science. Nor is the “pursuit of causal agents for information as outside the ken of science.” Quite the contrary. I’ve said repeatedly that inference to intelligent agents is very much a scientific quest. But not when the class of agents is unobservable and unavailable for independent study. This isn’t a definition of science, it is a simple matter of the operation or practice of science. If you can show how that class of agent can be studied with normal scientific methods, I’ll say it is science.
Randy
Hello again, Randy. Just to expand on my autopsy story above.
If instead of “suicide” the pathologist would have said,”natural forces” or “got caught out in a rain storm” would laughter on my part have been justified? That is, given the above criteria you cite as invalidating inference to an indeterminate intelligent agent, would it have been more scientific to posit a natural cause for this set of circumstances? Of course, no such natural forces seemed obvious at that point, but it doesn’t necessarily follow that no such natural set of causes might be discovered in the future that would account for this case, right? In fact, it would be unscientific (a faith position) to infer an intelligent causal agent in this case, especially given the possibility of a natural cause being discovered in the future.
My guess is, Randy, that you would have laughed at “natural forces” as well – and I would suspect you would because you would interpret the physical stigmata of this case (precise tying of the rope, use of blanket, etc.) as evidencing intentionality and intelligence – phenomena not seen (except by faith) in natural forces. You would have inferred that the intelligence belonged to a man, as overwhelming experience precludes other specimens as viable candidates. You would have “inferred to the best answer.” Now, if the identical week-old corpse were found on a deserted island on which no other human presence had been detected for centuries, would this fact make natural forces a more likely candidate for this poor man’s circumstances? Would one really be taking a less-scientific position by positing a non-human intelligence, to explain this set of circumstances?
I look forward to your reply.
Larry
Randy,
I think the persistence in this exchange is paying off because with our last two posts we have finally discovered the fundamental issue on which we disagree, namely, whether one can infer from particular artifacts or set of circumstances (an effect), that contain a feature called specified complexity, directly to a class of causal agency called “Intelligence.” I maintain that one can, and you assert that one cannot (perhaps one can, but one would not be making a scientific inference, but a faith inference). You assert that one can not directly make that inference to “intelligence” but can make it indirectly by identifying an agent that we know empirically possesses intelligence, at whatever level (you list several organisms that can and have been observed to evince some level of intelligence).
So I assert: effect → intelligence → agent
You assert: effect → agent → intelligence
It is vital at this point to see that this is the crux of the issue; if you are correct here then the rest of your critique of Meyer is valid and I would be illogical to disagree. On the other hand, if I am correct, your primary critique fails, as it is built on this fundamental premise.
First, I don’t believe that you have made the case that one must have a well-studied agent in order to infer intelligence (it is certainly nice to have such an agent to study, but why should I think it a necessary condition before intelligence can be inferred?).
Second, how did you come to determine that the organisms you listed above as intelligent, including humans, indeed possess intelligence? In addition, how do you “assess their degree of intelligence”? Is it not by observing the actions of the organism to see if, and to what degree, their actions affect a particular outcome, end or objective? For example, if a previously unknown animal was discovered (we’ll call it SETI) and it was our task to discover if SETI possessed intelligence, how could this task be accomplished if SETI just sat there and did absolutely nothing – no sounds, gestures or other actions? In fact, you would be unable to assess SETI’s level of intelligence without it performing an action(s) ( e.g., making sounds or symbols, doing a task or making an object). Once SETI performed some type of action, then we could judge whether the actions met our criteria for intelligent agency (say, carving a perfect replica of Randy from a block of wood with some tools that were in its cage, verses randomly slinging the tools around the cage).
Hence, the feature called “intelligence” is imputed to an agent because of artifacts produced by an agent that contain the hallmarks of design. From these artifacts (or actions) we infer intelligence. If we found SETI’s carving of Randy, even if we didn’t know anything about SETI, we could rationally and scientifically conclude from this effect (a past action) an intelligent causal agent. REMEMBER, we used this identical action (the carving by SETI) to infer that it possessed intelligence; what is it about this action being in the past that invalidates the inference to intelligence? Also, if someone who didn’t know about SETI found its carving of Randy, it would seem on your view that that person would not be able to infer that the causal agent of the carving possessed intelligence as this person knows nothing of SETI. What sayeth thou to this?
I think my scenario above strongly argues that the recognition of intelligence precedes the imputation of that feature to the agent (my assertion) and not vice versa (your assertion), and therefore ID’s major thesis stands.
Looking forward to your reply.
Larry
Larry, may I suggest that our difference of opinion is in a somewhat different vein. Your approach treats intelligence as an entity of its own whereas it is more of a characteristic of a being. I do not see how intelligence can be separated from the agent that has that characteristic. Hence, I believe you have presented a false dichotomy. Even so, I think your approach fails the basic test that I have offered. If you insist on talking in terms of detecting intelligence apart from an agent, I would simply ask again the same question: is that intelligence amenable to independent observation and study? That means you must indicate what type of intelligence you are inferring. Is it human intelligence? Then it is indeed scientific and the inference can be shown quite clearly to be false with regard to the origin of life. Is it animal intelligence? No answer needed. Is it God’s intelligence? Then it is a matter of faith and not of science for there is no way in which God’s (or any other indeterminate agent’s) intelligence is available for independent study.
As for your SETI examples, I generally don’t find them useful for this discussion. Those searches are predicated on non-terrrestrial beings existing under the same physical constraints as human beings and having similar capabilities, most notably being able to modulate hydrogen resonant frequencies. No one that I know is suggesting that they can take actions beyond the constraint of what we know as the laws of nature. So let’s not get distracted with SETI.
Randy,
Just one simple question: If you walked into a room and saw a perfect replica of yourself carved in wood, could you legitimately infer an intelligent agent was ultimately the causal agent of that artifact or not? If yes, how could you make that inference? If no, what is it that prevents you from making the inference to an intelligent causal agent?
Larry
Yes, definitely, because I have independent means of studying sculptures and the making of them and know quite a bit, independently, about the meaning of the shapes of faces. The abstract significance of the shape is immediately obvious and subject to independent study and corresponds to what we know of intelligent human capability.
Randy
Okay. If the sculpture was a perfect 12 inch tall replica of a Tyrannosaurus rex instead of you, I presume your answer would still be yes, right? Now, if the identically perfect T. rex sculpture was found fossilized in strata, and the sculpture was dated as being 70 million years old, could you legitimately infer an intelligent agent was ultimately the causal agent of that artifact or not? If yes, how could you make that inference? If no, what is it that prevents you from making the inference to an intelligent causal agent?
Larry
This is another example of why hypothetical examples are of little use in these discussions. It is always possible to construct unrealistic or impossible scenarios. But the criteria continue to be the same. To be scientific, one studies all intelligent sources that can be independently observed that would be a reasonable inference as being the causal agent. If none is available, and there is no known other cause, the correct answer is “I don’t know” and further data are needed to resolve the case. Hypothesizing the existence of agents that cannot be studied independently is fun to do but it is not science.
Randy
Hi Randy,
Actually I wasn’t “hypothesizing the existence of agents that cannot be studied independently” in my last post – I was trying to discover the criteria by which you infer intelligent agency. You had no problem inferring that an artifact such as a sculpture of a familiar object was sufficient to infer intelligent agency IF the artifact was dated within the history of human existence (the past 180 to 200 thousand years). However, if the exact same artifact were dated before human existence, you assert that the inference to intelligent agency would not be possible (in fact, it would be an “unrealistic or impossible scenario”). In order “to be scientific” one must be able to “study all intelligent sources that can be independently observed,” otherwise one cannot make the inference to intelligent agency from the artifact.
One question: What type of evidence could be adduced that would falsify your assertion?
Larry
Maybe we need to be more rigorous in terminology. There’s a difference between an inference to a design agent being scientific or not versus such an inference being considered likely or unlikely. To infer that a hominid designed the sculpture found in the Jurassic period is indeed scientific because the agent can be studied–but it will quickly be shown scientifically to be false, or at least extremely highly unlikely. If it’s not scientific, you can’t show it to be true or false. If it’s in the realm of science, you can at least observe it and study it and then see whether it makes sense.
I must not be making myself clear – let try it another way.
I assert that if you present to me an artifact, such a sculpture of a familiar complex object (such a the miniture T. rex), the object alone is sufficient for me to infer intelligent agency as its source.
You assert that the artifact alone is insufficient to infer intelligent agency – you must also know when the object was created.
My question that I wish for you to address is this: What type of evidence could be adduced that would falsify your assertion?
Larry