Meyer claims that specified complex information can only arise from an intelligent source, justifying that claim by citing a series of examples. One of those examples is computer code. In my previous post, I suggested that this was not an adequate example because of fundamental differences between computer code and DNA information. An obvious question is whether there is an example of specified complex information that is not derived from an intelligent source but solely from physical or chemical functionality. In this post I would like to offer just such an example.
The magnificent example of antibodies was presented by Dr. Craig Story in the December 2009 issue of Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith, Vol. 61, No. 4, p.221. (if you aren’t a member or don’t have a subscription, copies are available from the ASA office for $10 plus shipping and handling; contact asa@asa3.org.) In his article, Craig explains how the immune system works, focusing on the importance of the inherent randomness in the process. In this post, I would like to offer a physicist’s interpretation of his paper, with a focus on the information content. Craig has graciously reviewed these comments and corrected my errors in biology.
Stem cells in our bone marrow continuously produce a population of pre-B cells, so called because they are precursors to B cells, which manufacture antibodies when mature. These pre-B cells are all identical and have the same antibody gene DNA. This population therefore has a relatively low information content. All the complexity is within the cell and there is no diversity in the population of cells. As the pre-B cell population prepares to moves into the body, the cells undergo a transition into B cells. In the process, key segments of DNA in each cell are rearranged randomly to form a unique and novel DNA sequence. The process is described in detail in Craig’s paper. It is a constrained process so that the resulting antibody protein is always a particular folded configuration that may have affinity to an antigen, but the gene segments are randomly rearranged and joined to alter the magnitude of the affinity. The result is a population of B cells, each one of which is different in terms of its antibody DNA. This means that we have a transformation of a low information population of pre-B cells to a high information population of B cells, with reference to their antigen-binding abilities. The complexity has increased dramatically but we do not yet have specificity.
As a B cell moves through the body, it may or may not encounter an antigen with which it has affinity. If it does not, the B cell dies and that particular configuration no longer exists in the body. However, if an antigen appears with which a B cell has some degree of affinity, the B cell will attach to the antigen. In this case, that B cell will reproduce through cell division to create clones of itself. This process occurs throughout the population of B cells with the result that only B cells with some affinity to the environment of antigens survive. This is a basic level of specificity.
There is another level of specificity that Craig describes. A first-responder B cell usually will have a relatively small degree of affinity to an antigen. As this cell reproduces itself, an enzyme enhances the mutation rate of only the portion of the antibody genes that determines the affinity. In some cases, mutation rates can reach as much as one nucleotide per cell division. This means that the subpopulation of this particular B cell grows with a dynamic diversity of various degrees of affinity to that antigen. The cells with the strongest degree of affinity will preferentially attach to the antigens, leaving those with weaker affinity without antigens and therefore a death sentence. Over time, this subpopulation will be predominantly one with strong affinity to this particular antigen. This, in a nutshell, is why vaccines work.
In the bigger picture, this example shows how a homogeneous population of pre-B cells is transformed to a dynamically diverse population of B cells, with a tremendous increase in information content. This complex information then becomes highly specified by fine-tuning to match the antigens to which they are presented. The result is a high degree of specificity and complexity with no involvement of an intelligent designer as an immediate cause. This does not, of course, preclude the sustaining involvement of an Intelligent Designer at a metaphysical level.
Craig points out the critical role of randomness as a key characteristic of the cellular processes involved in the immune system. The random process of gene rearrangement is necessary to ensure a sufficiently broad range of binding specificities, such that some of them are almost sure to bind to one part of each pathogen. His example also illustrates clearly how highly complex and highly specified information is derived directly from a population of relatively low-information cells. Hence, the argument that Meyer makes that all complex specified information comes from an intelligent source does not withstand scrutiny.
The antibody example is a beautiful illustration of the basic processes of evolution. It begins with the common ancestry of the stem cells that produce an ancestral population of pre-B cells that are essentially identical. Descent with random variability occurs in the generation of the B cells, which are all unique with respect to their antibody gene DNA. Natural selection describes the way in which B cells that do not bind to an antigen will die while those that do bind to an antigen proceed to reproduce clones. The random variability of the dynamically diverse population of antibodies ensures the formation, within a short period of time, of antibodies with affinity to virtually any antigen. The subsequent way in which those B cells acquire stronger affinity to that antigen is a type of adaptation. Darwin suggested that these basic processes, operating over a long period of time, could account for the origin of species. Little did he suspect that these very processes are active continuously in our bodies on a relatively short time scale to provide a vital line of immunological defense.
Randy and Jon,
1. Let me first say that I have not and will not question anyone’s state of grace or integrity with regard to their personal faith – ones view on origins doesn’t affect ones state of grace, in my opinion. I trust that because I am questioning your assertions and apparent presuppositions that you are not taking that as some type of ad hominem attack – it is certainly not meant as such.
2. Randy is right, neither of you has said you needed to know “everything” about a causal agent before one could so assert it as a proper candidate as a causal agent; that was hyperbole on my part. My point, which is argued forcefully by Meyer on pages 388 – 394 and has not been rebutted by you, is that one needn’t know anything about the causal agent of an artifact in order to rightfully infer intelligence. I can’t make the argument as eloquently as Meyer, and it would take a lot of writing, so please refer to it and tell me why you disagree.
3. I would have to disagree with both of you that the g.o.d. of the immune system is an example of a “natural process” if you mean by that that an intelligent mind was not the ultimate causal agent – but rather undirected chemical and physical interactions were the sole antecedent to the g.o.d. Again, the recombinase enzymes are directing the gene recombinations and the recombinase enzymes are coded for by the genome.
Also, Jon, you seem to suggest that in order for an intelligent agent to “insert information” into a system, the agent is somehow confined to a temporal proximity to the expression of the action or artifact which is deemed as possessing specified complexity. This certainly is not necessarily the case. Intelligent agents routinely program complex information that unfolds sometime after the program was written. I could easily write a program that would put out nothing, or even gibberish, for thousands or millions of years as part of the program, and then output some form of complex information that would readily by recognize as being caused by an intelligent agent (say, instructions on how to write such programs, or poetry, or a manual on how to build random generators).
This is precisely how I view biological organisms including the immune system of humans. So, I would not say that the immune system, as such, is a “natural system” if by that you mean anything other than from an intelligent agent.
4. I take an approach to truth claims that is best summed up as: “Inference to the Best Explanation” or IBE. This approach is simply: What is the best explanation for a set of circumstances. In this case, we are looking for adequate causal agents for certain artifacts. The so-called ID folks are actually IBE; I think they do themselves a disservice calling themselves “ID” as this narrows IBE to the particular area of origins. I like IBE as it is a methodology, not a metaphysical position (which tends to rule out certain conclusions a priori). Young Earth Creationism (YEC) takes such a metaphysical position – they rule out certain conclusions, a priori. It seems that you all are also taking a metaphysical position – methodological naturalism. This position rules out certain conclusions a priori. I am presuming that this is the TE position. Hence, both YEC and TE take a metaphysical position that I believe takes an unwarranted position of a priori ruling out conclusions. IBE doesn’t suffer from this defect and hence is not influenced by metaphysical positions. Not that conclusions reached by IBE might have metaphysical implications, but the conclusions are not because of metaphysical presuppositions.
I would be very grateful if you interacted with each of my assertions above and pointed me to literature or rebutted/refuted them yourselves.
Larry
Randy
Thanks for the quick reply Randy.
2. You are correct again! You said something once about writing when tired! I gave you the wrong pages from my notes on Meyer’s book. I was meaning to refer you to the section “Argument from Ignorance” on pages 375 – 379. This deal with inferring intelligence without being able to study the causal agent.
3. My view on inferring intelligent agency is pretty straightforward: What is our experience on inferring intelligent agency – we find specified complexity. HOW the information is put into an artifact is an entirely different story. Are you saying that one must know HOW an artifact was put together before one can infer that an intelligent agent is the ultimate cause of that artifact? If that is what you mean, what is your warrant for such a requirement?
Perhaps you can explain to me what you mean by “natural process” so I don’t put words into your mouth (as I am wont to do!!).
4. In IBE I am referring to the quest for causal adequacy for phenomena we encounter in nature. It seems that you are saying that “science” is insufficient for this task. If “science” means finding the best explanation that doesn’t violate the metaphysical position of materialism (and therefore doesn’t necessarily reflect reality), then I would agree with you that science is inadequate. My question is, why should one embrace a definition of science that is relatively new, and which you know doesn’t necessarily reflect reality, when there is an approach that is better able to reflect reality, namely IBE?
Larry
2. Larry, that section in Meyer’s book deals with ignorance of a natural cause, not ignorance of the inferred intelligent agent. He is defending ID from the God of the gaps argument and this section is destined for a separate post later on. But I do not believe he is saying in this section that it is not necessary to know anything about the intelligent agent being inferred.
3. Once again, my point is that the agent’s existence and the methodology of design must be “amenable to study.” It must be accessible to science, that is, it must be observable in some way. On what basis? First, this is one of the basic tenets of science, that it is possible to do independent, reproducible studies. For historical science, it means one must be able to study the cause and effect relationships that operated in the past. Secondly, Meyer documents it himself when he shows in this book from Lyell, Darwin, and Scriven, that causal existence and causal adequacy must be independently shown before the cause can be considered as more than just plausible.
4. One of the most common confusions in discussions about ID is that there is somehow an erroneous definition of science by non-ID folks because they don’t allow science to encompass any causes beyond the so-called natural world. This is not a definition that one can arbitrarily change. This is just a simple consequence of the methodology of science. “relatively new?” Only as new as western science. “doesn’t reflect reality?” That depends on how you define reality. I believe there is a real natural world and a real supernatural world and that there is/can be interaction between the two. But the supernatural world is not composed of systematic and reproducible causes and effects that can be documented and used for causal relationships in the past, present, or future. It is not accessible by science because of the nature of the supernatural world, not because of an arbitrary definition of science. IBE is better able to reflect reality? Again, you need to avoid mixing the two levels of explanation. Are you speaking of the natural world or the supernatural world? You seem to be suggesting that influence from the supernatural world is a better explanation than one from the natural world, as if they somehow compete. That’s mixing up the two worlds in an inappropriate way. A “complete” explanation from the natural world does not preclude an explanation from the supernatural world. One is not “better” than the other. All this is well documented and discussed by, among others, Donald MacKay.
Randy
McKay is indeed very helpful. Here’s another suggestion.
One of the clearest, most even-handed, and most charitable (to both sides) analysis of the debate over ID from a Christian perspective I’ve seen is the second chapter of Owen Gingerich’s little book “God’s Universe.” That chapter is entitled “Dare A Scientist Believe in Design?” This book was published in 2006 by Harvard’s Belknap Press. ISBN number is 978-0-674-02370-3. One can find several on-line videos of Gingerich giving talks with the same title as that chapter, but I cannot find the complete written text of the chapter on-line (though Google Books has many of the chapter’s pages in its “preview” – of course, it omits various pages to avoid copyright infringement). I bought the book, and think it’s well worth its modest cost.
Thanks Randy. I think Meyer is pretty clear in using specified complexity as unique to intelligence and that this fact precludes the necessity of the causal agent being present to study in order to determine causal adequacy. He is not being ad hoc here, he is simply making a logical deduction.
You’re simply mistaken to say that methodological naturalism defines Western science from its inception – though this is certainly how materialists like to portray it today. Actually, Western science has employed IBE. The mistake has been in not recognizing that material interactions are part of the world and hence under the banner of IBE. In fact, most of the giants of science, including Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler et.al. were Christians, and the notion that the effects that they were describing were ultimately mere chemical and physical interactions was entirely foreign to them – they believed the universe was a product of a Mind and hence would bear the marks of intelligence and logic. But physical and chemical interactions as the ultimate explanation for the effects of the universe is exactly what materialism asserts, a worldview that contradicts theism.
The traditional materialist straw man approach is to pretend that someone who employs IBE will soon be attributing artifacts to orcs or hobgoblins or some other mythical creature or god. But can you name a single scientist who employs IBE that actually does this? I’ve always been amused by this straw man as it is so utterly ridiculous and unfounded. The assumption is that material forces are somehow missing in the world of the one who is anything other than a materialist! How positively odd. When a patient came into my ER I didn’t attribute his fever and rash to “spirits” and sacrifice some chicken for his healing. I searched for the best explanation for the symptoms and signs and diagnosed the patient accordingly. However, when I had a teenager come in with “BEER” in block letters carved into his lower leg, I didn’t pretend that mere material forces were the only antecedents responsible for this senario – I inferred a mind as the author of the physical findings. A mind is a non-physical entity that is not accounted for by mere chemical-physical interactions (unless you take a metaphysical position called materialism, whose practitioners admit the problem of explaining the mind and consciousness from their presuppositions). Hence, IBE is a better method of discovery reality here (correspondence to the way things really are) than the materialist worldview.
So, material forces have always been part of the reality for scientists – that they are the ONLY reality is a trend in scientific thinking in the past 100 years. The growing ID movement of the past 45 years (Polanyi, et.al.) is a refreshing renaissance of the IBE approach of the great scientists of the Western world.
I’m curious to know why you don’t think that the effects of non-material forces (of mind) are not amenable to scientific investigation – why not? Information is a non-material entity that can be expressed in the physical world and we study it all of the time. Sure, we may not have direct access to the causal entity itself, but why can’t one study the physical effects that such forces exert? Heck, we can’t really even say what energy is, but we study its effects constantly. The same with gravity. Are you saying that we can’t know anything about these entities even though we don’t know exactly what they are?
Maybe I’ve mucked up this blog with my musings – I appreciate your comments and patience with me. Dan Kastelein has suggested I go to an ASA meeting so that I can sit down with a bunch of you guys and interact that way. Does ASA ever have meetings in continental Europe (I don’t get to the U.S. much)?
Chuck has given me a lot of resources (Thanks Chuck!! – and Perspectives is fantastic, as well) – I think I will do some more reading and contemplation before I make any more comments.
Thanks, Randy and ASA members for making this forum – it is really making me think and explore more. It is also exciting to know that so many brothers and sisters in Christ are out there doing great science and philosophy – keep up the great work!
Blessings,
Larry
Larry,
I’m responding to a few points in this post and in yours from February 25. I don’t think the whole ID program is “a waste or illegitimate” or even non-science — I recall saying things like ID is valid as a philosophical point of view, maybe even slightly scientific, although I’ll admit to a growing doubt about its scientific value the more I look into it.
You mentioned finding a painting in your office, and why can’t we conclude it was the product of intelligence? If you are referring to a painting in the ordinary sense (canvas, specific arrangements of paints, made from discernable materials that we know as human-manufactured paints, set in a wooden frame of known style of woodworking), then the conclusion is obvious. It wasn’t a product of intelligence. It was specifically a product of human-generated design. How do we know that? Because we know humans, we know paints, we know how humans think, we know how they put paint to canvas to create art, we know how wooden picture frames are constructed, etc. You don’t have to infer intelligence — you already have privileged information about the specific item of reference to know specifically what kind of intelligent action was responsible. I have made the point before about “privileged information” in reference to other arguments from analogy on this subject. Humans are beings that can be studied, even if part of the subject (mind) is non-physical. They are not “indeterminate designers,” neither are oil-based paintings unknown objects of specified complexity.
But what if a person came, not into an office, but up over the crest of a hill and saw a marvelously beautiful scene. Something like this picture from the Grand Canyon. This is such a beautiful, complex, and artistic scene. Could it be described as specified complexity? I’m not sure but regardless, how could something so intricately beautiful be the product of mere chance and material forces? Isn’t such a scene, generalized beyond the limited context of oil-based canvas paintings, just as awe-inspiring and complex as any painting that could be created by human art? Why shouldn’t we conclude that such an awesome scene must have been generated by intelligent action, rather than blind change and material forces? What would it take to falsify either the conclusion of intelligent action or material forces in this case? (I made a similar argument about human and nature-generated symphonies in a previous post.)
However, if you were a geologist, you would know a great deal about the material aspects of how the Grand Canyon was formed. From a scientific viewpoint, they would see no reason to conclude that an unspecified designer had anything to do with creating this particular scene, when wind, water, etc. are known to be able to produce these or similar effects. Even flood geologists are willing to admit that this scene was created by natural forces.
As a Christian who also knows a little about geology, I agree with them about the action of natural forces. I also agree with the Christian faith which says God is the “creator of all things, visible and invisible.” However (to make a point again), the faith statement about God making the Grand Canyon is not a replacement for an explanation of how natural forces also made the Grand Canyon. If the existence of God (er, intelligent designer) of the Grand Canyon happens to be a logical, scientific inference, it may be true but that’s about as far as ID can go (if that far). It doesn’t add anything to our knowledge of science or the natural world, nor does it preclude material explanations simultaneous with the “intelligent design” explanation.
If the question is, “Either God or the forces of wind & water created the Grand Canyon – which one was it?”; then the Inference to the Best Explanation would have to be wind and water – we can demonstrate evidence that points to this being the case, but we can’t necessarily point to direct evidence that God did it by fiat. By why should it be either/or? And if we say both, is the “God explanation” scientifically demonstrable, or is it a matter of faith?
However, if the question is, “Where did material substance of the universe come from anyway, from which the rocks and water were made?”; then that’s quite a different question.
One last comment for now. I realize that I used the G-d word several times in this post, much to the chagrin of the ID people. I don’t apologize for that in this case. I do strongly believe (based on evidence) that most of ID is really a cover for presenting a scientific/logical case for the existence of God. Returning to the more pertinate subject of DNA, I wrote earlier about several possible types of designers, to which I would welcome comment. Most ID people that I know of are not seriously arguing for a human or “intelligent alien” creator of DNA. So they must either be arguing for a totally unknown agent, which by definition has no direct evidence of its existence, or they are arguing for some form of god or God. I do feel like most of ID’s “we aren’t talking about God” rhetoric is a veneer to maintain an appearance of scientific legitimacy. That’s just my opinion.
Jon Tandy
Larry, you’re right that many early scientists proposed specific divine actions as causes for specific features of the material world. An interesting look at the transition to the modern “rules” of science, which exclude scientific reference to any causal agent (identified or not) who could possibly defy natural law, is given by Ronald Numbers in a Terry Lecture available on-line. See:
“Aggressors, Victims, and Peacemakers: Historical Actors in the Drama of Science and Religion” by Ronald Numbers, available at
http://streaming.yale.edu:8080/ramgen/cmibroadcast/terry/numbers_091506.rm
One thing is clear to me. Methodological naturalism became the established method of science not because of agnostic or atheistic scientists, but because of scientists who were Christian and were trying to read both of God’s “books” (Scripture and nature) in ways that, as Francis Bacon put it, would not “unwisely confound” the two “books.”
Thanks for the dialogue. Yours in Christ,
Chuck
Jon,
First let me make a few general comments and then I will attempt to answer some of your questions and issues. The overall tenor of your post is very similar to what I have encountered with my atheist friends on the discussion of origins. They assert that in discussing origins one must only make assertions of science and not of faith. They insist that the supernatural not be allowed in the conversation. I consent to their conditions. I then present the case from intelligent design, never mentioning a deity or the supernatural; I’d build a case from scientific facts, universal experience and apply the laws of logic. Invariably, my atheist friends will spend most of their time speaking about God, and not science. They inform me how God would or would not have created the artifacts of nature and how the data do not align with the way God would do all of this creating. I will then try to get them to speak in terms of science, reminding them of the conditions that they had set, namely, not to bring God into the conversation. But they can’t help themselves – they repeatedly come back to the God theme. They will then accuse me of deliberately not talking about God, when in fact, they maintain, my entire case has been about God! I find it intriguing that you are doing the exact same thing, Jon. I still don’t know quite what to make of that.
Also, many of your objections are addressed in detail and at length in Meyer’s book – have you read it?
Now, to your particular assertions: You assert concerning a painting that one might find in an office: “It wasn’t a product of intelligence. It was specifically a product of human generated design”. Later you state, “You don’t have to infer intelligence – you already have privileged information about the specific item of reference to know specifically what kind of intelligent action was responsible.” Both of these references, as written, are illogical. First, human design by definition requires intelligence. Second, you explicitly state in your second sentence that design is a “kind of intelligent action”. So these statements are self-referentially incoherent. Hence, I’m not entirely sure what you are trying to say. If you are trying to assert that one cannot infer intelligent agency from an artifact that bears the hallmarks of specified complexity without knowing the identity of the causal agent, Meyer addresses this unsupported assertion on pages 328ff.
In your example of the Grand Canyon you shift the discussion to the area of aesthetics, an area that has not been part of the conversation. That notwithstanding, you impose a false dichotomy on the ID position that does not exist, namely, the notion of non-overlapping magisteria (NOMA) – a dichotomy that actually reflects your own position. ID does not take an a priori position on the types of causes that may or may not be a candidate for an effect: the cause may be mere physical-chemical interactions; it might be intelligence; it might be some combination of the two. So while it may seem that you have put ID on the horns of a dilemma, the horns are of your own making: you have created a strawman that does not represent the ID position.
Finally, in your last paragraph you make a couple of logical errors. The first is the genetic fallacy, in which a perceived defect in the origin of a claim or thing is taken to be evidence that discredits the claim or thing itself. Meyer covers this in detail on page 447 to 448. This logical fallacy is inadequate in addressing ID’s argument, in fact it is a rhetorical device employed to avoid dealing with the argument. The second logical error is that of the ad hominem, which is closely related to the genetic fallacy, where you attack the character of the person making the claim and use this as an argument against the claim. In no uncertain terms (”ID is really a cover,” “not seriously arguing,” “is a veneer to maintain an appearance”) you accuse “most ID people” of being deceptive and being liars. I have found this same propensity in some Young Earth Creationists (YEC), with their “compromise” and “slippery slope” comments. Indulging in this type of rhetoric does not further rational intercourse and is rather uncharitable.
ID folks simply want others to interact with the argument itself without the red herrings (another fallacy you put in your final paragraph – the insistence of identifying the designer before you are willing to consider the inference to the intelligent agent itself) and other distractions – is that an unreasonable expectation?
Larry
Larry,
I think your comment indicates clearly that I have failed most miserably in communicating my arguments in my posts. I will try to do better in the future. Each of your comments deserves its own response since I believe they reflect a serious miscommunication.
However, I am disturbed that this thread of comments has digressed too far. Previously Jon and Chuck tried to bring it back on track, but you have jumped to the big issues without working through the logic carefully.
May I respectfully request that you focus on the specific issue of this post? That is, the example of antibodies, as articulated in Craig’s article, shows how complex specified information can be generated through a process of reproduction with variation and natural selection and no direct involvement of an intelligent designer (while still acknowledging the higher level of involvement of God as creator and sustainer). Let’s stick to that specific argument for now. I’m not even asking that you agree, but that you confirm that you understand the argument.
Randy
“Larry,
I think your comment indicates clearly that I have failed most miserably in communicating my arguments in my posts. I will try to do better in the future. Each of your comments deserves its own response since I believe they reflect a serious mis-communication.”
Ramdy
I caught up yesterday in my reading of all the comments. My understanding of your argument is quite clear at least I think so. The immune system in responding to infection shows an example of development of information, complex specified information that does not directly involve any intelligence. Therefore Meyer is wrong that CSI is always the produce of intelligence. Therefore Meyer is wrong that the information in the first cell’s DNA must have been a product of intelligence.
I’m sure there is more depth to the story than what I am expressing but that seems to be the nutshell to me. I think you are correct and that you have defeated Meyer’s argument. As I have said before, however, I think it probable that the first cell resulted from a direct action of God that ensured the right components came together in the proper manner but that belief is a long way from scientific proof.
Randy,
I’m sorry – I didn’t mean to veer from the point – I truly thought I was answering issues in Jon’s post.
I believe that the major differences are actually not in the details, but precisely in the big picture – the underlying presuppositions. I will refrain from discussing those until you deem that the time is appropriate.
Honestly, I would have to admit that I’ve not followed the argument that Craig has made and that you have reiterated – I think I understand WHAT you assert, but I can’t see that it makes sense. Let me clearly lay out why I don’t think your assertions work:
Craig describes aspects of the production of specific B-cells and seems to indicate that (call this Assertion 1): because there is a random-generating process as part of the overall enterprise, that this fact somehow demonstrates that no intelligence was involved in the process. This conclusion then seems to serve as an inductive base for the notion that (call this Inference 1): all systems that evidence specified complexity could therefore be derived by a non-intelligent causal agent/force.
As I’ve argued earlier, (call this Objection 1): The organism’s DNA codes for all of the components of the Immune system, including the random generator sub-routine – and it is the source of this DNA that it is the focus of Meyer’s book in which he claims that intelligence is the best explanation for the existence of the information encoded in DNA which is necessary to construct the components of the Immune system; and (call this Objection 2): It doesn’t logically follow that just because a system lacks a “direct” intelligent agent (I take this to be an agent physically present to roll the dice for the g.o.d. of the immune system) that one may not infer intelligence. As I have also argued earlier, computer programmers are rarely present when the software they have designed is generating output, random or otherwise, yet one does not attribute the output to non-intelligent sources because the causal agent in not “directly” mediating the current execution of the software.
So, given my objections, how is Craig justified in ruling out intelligent agency for the immune system? Indeed, it seems prima facie to me that the immune system bears the hallmark of intelligent agency in spades. In order for Craig to make his point he would have to point to a non-biological system (one without preprogrammed information) that used random events to produce specified complexity, or information.
Do my objections make sense?
Larry
” I think I understand WHAT you assert, but I can’t see that it makes sense. ”
Actually you don’t understand because of the many logical fallacies buried in your response. I’ll take a look at just one example. First of all, Meyer claims that CSI implies (in a modus ponens sense) intelligent design. A counter-example was presented. This does not deny intelligent design itself, rather, it invalidates the specific inference that CSI implies intelligent design.
This specific example shows the way ID really should proceed. Namely, take known intelligently designed and non-intelligently designed processes and compare and contrast them — in this case, CSI was tried and found wanting. Then, you can see if there exists processes which are not attributable to humans but are nonetheless intelligently designed. ID hasn’t done this. It has used a post hoc approach instead. This is why it is so difficult even to determine CSI at all for any process let alone prove design from it.
Rich,
You have some good points here that could be elaborated on further (for instance, what logical fallacies?). In particular is the statement that “this does not deny intelligent design itself”. Even if Randy’s example provides an adequate counter-example to one of Meyer’s key assumptions, it is a long, LONG way from saying, “therefore DNA cannot be shown to have originated by intelligent design”. I don’t think Randy has made that assertion, although I think others may have assumed it.
However, one of the problems with what you have written is in finding a “non-intelligently designed process” for comparison with an intelligently designed process. Here I am specifically excluding the origin of the DNA, which was necessary for the immune system to function in the first place, and I’m focused exclusively on Randy’s example of the *process* of creating a specified population of antibody cells from a population of unspecified pre-B cells.
It might seem that Randy’s example is a clear case of a process which does not have an intelligent agent present; and therefore, it’s an example of how a physical/chemical process can create complexity in the absence of intelligence. However, even in the limited context of the production of B cells, how do you *prove* that this process functions in the absence of intelligent agency? It might be that the universe itself is animistic, and therefore all of nature possesses intelligence that acts in all its natural processes. It might be that God’s Providence is ever present in the created order, and that His continuous sustenance is necessary for the antibody process to function. It might even be that an unspecified but intelligent alien has the power to peer into the cells of our bodies and somehow manipulates our immune systems constantly in order to help us fight antigens.
In other words, if you wanted to use this example as a “non-intelligently designed process” for purposes of comparison with “intelligently designed processes”, how do you prove scientifically that no intelligence is present in the process, EVEN EXCLUDING the presumed claim of ID that intelligence must have been present in the origination of DNA in order for the process to function in the first place? I don’t think it’s possible to identify a non-intelligently designed process, because it comes down to a philosophical/theological assumption about nature. In this case, it may be a good inference, but it can never be proven scientifically.
The comparison you ask about is similar to one I have invited others to comment on, but have received no response. I would still invite anyone to comment, because someone smarter than me may be able to give me a different viewpoint. The point was regarding a comparison of two symphonies.
Briefly repeated, it was this: You have the task of comparing two streams of sound, to determine whether they have their source in an intelligent agent or not. The two streams of sound are a Beethoven symphony, and what I have called a “forest symphony” (sounds of wind, water, birds, wolves, etc.) You don’t have any knowledge of the origin of the music or the particular instruments, the purpose of the music, or whether the music was produced by the intentionality of an intelligent composer or conductor; only the physical evidence of the stream of sound itself. Both streams of sound include a complex interplay of overlapping musical frequencies, changing dynamics and rhythm, repetitive thematic elements, and contrapuntal melodies.
The argument can been made (knowing what we know about a Beethoven symphony), that it obviously contains complex, specified information which therefore implies the existence of an intelligent designer. But in the absence of such privileged knowledge about the history of music, stringed instruments and human orchestras, how does one distinguish between the CSI in one symphony vs. the CSI in the other? (Or is the analogy flawed on the basis of ID’s definition of CSI, and if so how?) If the presence of CSI is sufficient to reliably infer intelligent agency in one symphony, why isn’t it in the other?
But even this example suffers in the same sense as the one I mentioned above. How does one prove that the “forest symphony” is undirected by intelligent agency, in order to use it as a counter-example? How can I prove scientitically or logically that there exists no invisible forest conductor who could be directing every bird to sing, every wolf to howl in their time, and every rustle of leaves? By the same token, how could one prove scientifically that the “conductor” must exist, if he cannot be observed or studied?
Jon,
I know it’s been a long delay in responding to your question about the two symphonies but I haven’t quite figured out what to say about it. Let me at least make a start. I think what holds me back is your stipulation “You don’t have any knowledge of the origin of the music or the particular instruments, the purpose of the music, or whether the music was produced by the intentionality of an intelligent composer or conductor; only the physical evidence of the stream of sound itself.” If that restriction exists, the answer most likely will be “we don’t know.” The point of my post on Historical Causal Analysis was that one needed independent evidence of the existence and adequacy of causal agents for a given effect. This means one must be able to take the time to study and observe those connections. So if you hear these two symphonies, you really need to be able to study the sounds, independently investigate how such sounds are generated. How does a wave interact with rocks and air to generate sound? How does a bird use its form of intelligence to generate a song? How does a violin get constructed and played? What factors influence relative timing of sounds? One must be able to study these effects in order to draw reasonable conclusions about any causal effects. Your restriction means that we can’t do that, or must go on past experience alone. Maybe we have enough past observation to be able to do that. But in no case that I know of, can we deduce a cause solely by the effect with no prior experience or ability to study it independently.
You raise many other good points and I’m considering addressing them in a separate post.
Randy
Randy,
Agreed, my recent restatement of the analogy went a little over the top in restricting our knowledge of the source of sounds. Here is part of the problem with analogies between human-generated complexity with complexity found in nature. If I allow you knowledge of violins and cellos, then it’s necessary to ask, “How do those instruments come to have the particular sounds they do?” Then you have to look at the human design of the violin, and recognize there is a human pulling the bow, in response to a human conductor, reading a score of music designed by a human. Then it’s obvious that this sound was the result of intelligent design at several levels.
What I’m trying to do is offer a counter-analogy to argument from human designed things to natural biological things. Meyer (and ID in general) argue from a human designed computer (or Paley’s watch) to show CSI implies intelligence, and then reason to things of unknown origin. I’m trying to say, no, you can’t assume the existence of intelligence to reason from the CSI in a Beethoven symphony. If the argument from analogy is to hold, we need to be able to argue from the information itself without relying on that privileged information about the intelligence behind it, because in the case of the DNA (etc.) we likewise only have direct evidence of the data itself. So I’m trying to compare two streams of sound on the basis of the physical complexity itself, to illustrate that the complexity in the data isn’t necessarily sufficient to be able to infer back to the intelligent or non-intelligent source of the information.
So if we can allow my analogy to consider the physical secondary causes of the sound in both cases, without relying on prior knowledge of primary causation (Beethoven or an intelligent conductor of either symphony), I think it is difficult or impossible to reliably infer intelligence from the information itself. It might be true, but not necessarily guaranteed to be correct. Now, my argument might be faulty. Maybe an “informational analysis” of both complex sets of sounds would truly reveal a substantive difference in the complexity of the Beethoven symphony, that would be sufficient to infer an intelligent source uniquely in that case.
Again, it’s exceedingly difficult to do this without relying on effectively circular reasoning (prior knowledge of intelligence to imply the conclusion of intelligence). I.e., we know that humans in Western culture produce music on specific frequencies of sound and not others. Beethoven’s symphonies include sounds on only particular frequencies; therefore, it must have been designed as part of Western classical music. But what if we are dealing with a different score of music intentionally (intelligently) written on different frequencies from Western culture? Likewise, if instead of Paley’s watch, we find a beautifully intricate shell of unknown origin, with intricate structures and inner workings, is the ID conclusion of intelligence as reliable when we don’t have privileged knowledge, such as the mechanics of human-produced watches? I believe this is one reason the ID “arguments from analogy” fail to be as logically compelling as some believe.
Jon Tandy
Yes, Jon, I think you and I are saying the same thing. Studying the physical complexity by itself with no other knowledge is insufficient. Meyer agrees as well, citing Lyell, Darwin, and Scriven and even Dembski to show that an independent pattern must be known, that an independent causal existence and causal adequacy must be shown. The difference is that Meyer thinks he has done that for DNA by claiming that the relationship between human intelligence and computer code (among other examples) is identical (with respect to CSI) to the relationship between an indeterminate intelligent designer and DNA information. It is this claim that I suggest is the fundamental error in Meyer’s book.
I would differ with you only slightly in one respect. That is, that I don’t think we are in danger of circular reasoning as long as we are talking about separate, observable events. If we find something totally unknown, our response will be “I don’t know” until we do the careful study. We may hypothesize all sorts of sources, including intelligent ones. If those sources are not observable or amenable to study, it’s not a scientific hypothesis. If it is subject to study, we can do the work to see if it provides us with the necessary insight.
Randy
Randy:
I’ve been too busy to either follow or reply to the active conversation here. But I would like to make a few comments before you all rush ahead of me again.
First, regarding information, I think that the best way to get at what is very loosely being thrown around as “information” is to consider closed systems. Shannon information is wholly inadequate to get at the concept and ought to be put out of our heads as soon as possible.
Thinking only as a physicist, we say that the entropy of a closed “natural” system will increase over time. That is, that “disorder” will increase. Disorder is in some sense inversely related to what we might mean as “information.” If this is so, then in “natural” systems information decays over time in a closed system. We see evidence of this is in all our world, cars rust and buildings collapse, etc. We say that the increasing entropy in a natural, closed system is a movement to more probable states. Whether this is an empirical statement or a definition, I leave for you to ponder. The customary Shannon relationship for information reflects the inverse relationship between so-called information and increasing probability. More broadly, we appreciate that a necessary proposition (e.g., bachelors are unmarried men, or 2 + 2 = 4) tell us nothing about our world because they are thought to be true in all possible worlds, and hence have low (or zero) information content.
Were we to consider any closed system, we would expect that if it were a natural system, the information content will decrease with time, that is, it will become more disordered. Information is a measure of order. So that if a closed system’s degree of order should increase over time, that is move to a less probable state, we have prima facie reasons for suspecting it is not a natural system. This suggestion says nothing of non-closed systems. It does not deny that entropy or information could not increase locally. We are only speaking of closed systems. Any system can, for a while, be isolated (at least in principle) including the human immune system.
I agree with Randy that “specified complexity” is going to be a difficult measure of information. What I would like to suggest is one that I’m certain has at least been suggested else where (even if I don’t know where). The notion is that what we are really after in information is not so much probability (a vague notion in any case since it requires a model and context within which to make the computation), but something like “connectedness.” What makes a sytem appear designed is its inter-relatedness, the parts are somehow integrated into a whole so that we can speak of parts serving functions.
So what I suggest is that we try to think of information in terms of numbers of connections or relationships. An entitity with a high connectiveness is likely also to be improbable, but surely not all improbable events are highly connected. A sequence of 10,000 heads may be an exceedingly unlikely class of events, but it appears to exhibit no connectively between parts.
This is all not clear, as a moments thought, will verify. What do we mean by connectivity? Is there a unique count of connectivity? Is there a unique enumeration of “parts”? All of these are problematic. Nonetheless, when we start thinking in terms of functionality, we naturally start thinking in terms of parts. Once we have parts we can begin to think of the connections between parts. Indeed, functionality can serve as a means of classifying connections. We can begin to distinguish connections that are necessary constituents of a given function and those that are not. This measure can serve as a metric for “functional complexity.”
The point of all of this is to find a measure of something that we associate with what we are calling “intelligence” or “design.” What has been suggested is the “informational” content or the degree of complex specified information. Whatever it is, my suggestion is to examine closed systems. In natural closed systems, this total measure (whatever it is), will not increase, and will likely decrease. In so-called intelligent closed systems, it will increase. Note, that according to this model “intelligent” systems are, by definition, un-natural systems. Also note that we need not measure total “informational” content of a system (a likely impossible metric), but only changes in “informational” content. Also note that, as I see it, Randy’s assertion that isolated anti-body creation biological systems increase informational content is, at least unproven, and likely false.
Note also that a materialist will, of course, hold that all systems are natural systems, including humans. Hence, the “informational” content of isolated human systems cannot increase over time. There is, then, nothing like what we call “intelligence,” and perhaps nothing like we are calling “information.”
bill powers
Bill,
Thanks for giving me the opportunity to clarify a very common misperception. Though it seems counterintuitive at first, information actually increases with disorder. You stated “Disorder is in some sense inversely related to what we might mean as “information.” If this is so…” Actually, they are directly related and information increases as disorder increases.
Consider a simple example of a 1-D row of 10 atoms in equilibrium. There is perfect order–and virtually no information. Remove one atom and put it in between two others. Now you have one vacancy and one interstitial. The disorder (entropy) has increased and so has the information. That applies both to the information required to describe the system and to the information the system can convey.
But information capacity may not be useful, as Meyer points out. That’s why he talks about specificity. I used the terms “function” and “meaning” to talk about different ways in which we consider usefulness of information.
I refer you to other comments I’ve made in this thread that are along the same lines. The key point is that there is no principle that says information cannot increase without an intelligent source. Physical complexity (i.e. entropy) can indeed increase and usefulness can be selected by what works.
By any measure of information, the antibody example shows a clear increase in information. The initial state is one of a large population of identical cells. The next state is one of a large population of cells which are all different. That is an unequivocal increase in the amount of information by any measure.
Randy